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Constitutional Law-The Problem With Obscenity
There will always be battle in the area of free opinion; there always
has been since Plato thought that Homer should be expurgated and said
so. I believe in the constant workings of these jaws of natural censor-
ship and am willing to work my own as a part of the process .... I
know of no more important time for courageous good taste than when
there is not much of it about. Liberty is easier to win than to deserve,
and if it is treated as either a license or a vacuum, the police will come
or the walls will fail.
Restraints on freedom of thought and expression have long been
regarded as fundamentally incompatible with the democratic ideal.
However, even the most ardent supporter of a literal interpretation
of the first amendment is willing to recognize the validity of certain
restraints on freedom of expression.2 Prior to 1957, such restraints
were imposed upon "words which are likely to incite to a breach of
the peace, or with sufficient probability tend either to the overthrow
of the government by illegal means or to some other overt anti-social
conduct. '" s In 1957, the area of restraint was enlarged to include
that which tends to excite prurient interests, i.e., the "obscene. ' 4
In the United States today, no less than at other times and places,
qualifications on freedom imposed in the name of public morals have
come under heavy attack. Historically, morals are derived from
mores - customs which are deemed essential to the well-being of the
group. Their very elusiveness renders controversy inevitable. The
resultant dashes are dramatically apparent in those instances where
unconventional modes of expression collide with sexual censorship.
In a society such as ours, where the law plays such an important role,
it is only natural that the subject should be put to the test our system
has adopted for the settlement of conflict.
The Law expresses the feelings of the community, and the com-
munity has expressed its disapproval of the "obscene." However,
the Law, unlike the politician, cannot choose the middle road. It
must either enter the field and attempt to affect it entirely, or choose
not to enter. Once it has made the choice to enter, as it has done in
the area of obscenity, the Law must establish certain minimums of
conduct and maximums of control. Herein lies the problem, for the
1. Statement by Judge Curtis Bok, for the American Library Association - American Book
Publishers Counsel, Westchester Conference on the Freedom to Read, quoted in Larrabee,
The Cuiltura Context of Sex Cemnorship, 20 L. & CONTzmp. PROB., 672, 688 n.73 (1955).
2. "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting
fire in a theater and causing a panic." Statement by Aft. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
3. United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion).
4. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). This decision seems, for the present, to
have put to rest any argument that obscenity was in the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press and could be interfered with only when it created a clear and present danger
to some interest which the state or federal government has a right to protect.
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subject of obscenity is one of the most elusive and difficult concepts
known to the law.
WHAT IS THE ULTIMATE PURPOSE OF THE OBSCENITY LAWS?
The evils aimed at by obscenity legislation, and by the courts in
applying this legislation to literature, have seldom been clearly stated.
For the most part, what is talked about is the effect that "obscene"
literature has upon its readers. Often suggested is the offensive or
shocking effect upon the reader;5 however, more commonly men-
tioned is the danger of stimulating impure sexual thoughts or sexual
conduct contrary to the laws or accepted moral standards of the com-
munity.6 In addition to these supposed effects upon individuals, an-
other evil has sometimes been mentioned - the danger that litera-
ture challenging the accepted moral standards of the community
might actually bring about a change in the community standards.
Only slight consideration need be given to this "danger" since such a
view is contrary to the very purpose for guaranteeing freedom of ex-
pression. A democratic society must be free to perfect its own stand-
ards of conduct and belief, and any risk which may possibly be in-
volved does not justify censorship on such a basis.
Any harm which might come from offending or shocking the
sensitive reader is also worth only slight consideration, since the harm
which might result is only minor and is considerably outweighed by
the value of free expression. Literature that might offend the sensi-
tive seldom offends, for the sensitive seldom read such literature.
Further, to those few readers who will be offended by what they
read, the shock to their decency is usually very trivial. They might
become embarassed or momentarily shocked and distressed, but any
such reaction is usually of short duration and causes no serious harm.
It can thus be seen that the basic evil aimed at is either the dan-
ger of stimulating impure sexual thoughts or of stimulating sexual
conduct contrary to the accepted moral standards of the community.
There has been no real effort, however, to consider these two evils
separately. As a result, much confusion exists as to the ultimate pur-
pose of obscenity regulations. Is the mere stimulating of impure
thoughts in the mind of the reader, without any risk that these
thoughts will be translated into action inconsistent with moral stand-
5. See Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953); United States v. Dennett, 39
F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930); United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934); Commonwealth v. Isenstadr, 318 Mass.
543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
6. These two quite different tests are often confused by the courts. See notes 25-29 infra
and accompanying text.
7. See United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093 (No. 14,571) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879);
Commonwealth v. DeLacy, 271 Mass. 327, 171 N.E. 455 (1930); People v. Dial Press, Inc.,




ards, in itself a sufficient evil to justify regulation? Or, is it the in-
consistent conduct which we are attempting to prevent? The relative
weight that should be given to each of these evils when thrown into
balance against the loss to society from such regulation requires criti-
cal consideration. It is with an examination of these evils and some
of the difficulties involved in proscribing what is termed "obscene,"
that this note is concerned.
INHERENT PROBLEMS IN OBSCENITY REGULATION
The Problem of Definition
The difficulties begin with the definition of the word "obscene."
In most, if not all, of those states which have statutes relating to
obscenity," the term is defined by adding one or more of the follow-
ing words: disgusting, filthy, indecent, immoral, impure, lascivious,
lewd, licentious, and vulgar.9 These words have no objective mean-
ing."" Dictionaries often define them in terms of one another."
They achieve reality only "through assumed standards of social sex-
ual behavior or assumed theories of cause-and-effect."' 2  In practice,
therefore, the only meaning any of these terms can have is that given
them by the material so described. To this extent, the law of obscen-
ity is the sum of the cases tried with respect to it. It is not until a
particular book or other type of literature is declared by the courts
to be "obscene" that one is able to define the definition, and then
only as to a particular set of facts.
This case by case method of defining the "obscene" is not the only
way of effecting sex censorship. Censorship can be accomplished
through boycott or other forms of extralegal coercion.' 3 If the
method of defining the obscene seems illogical when done on a case
by case method by the courts, it is even more illogical when done by
these extralegal forces. To prove the point, the definition used by
one local Detroit official was: "If I feel that I wouldn't want my
thirteen-year-old daughter reading it, I decide it's illegal."' 4 The
8. Only New Mexico and Alaska do not have such statutes.
9. See Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38
MINN. L. REV. 295, 320 (1954).
10. "Few words are as fluid and vague in content as the six deadly adjectives - obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, and disgusting - which are the basis of censorship. No
two persons agree on these definitions." ERNST & SEAGLE, To THE PURE ... A STUDY OF
OBscENrY AND THE CENSOR vii (1928).
11. Obscene - "impure, unchaste, indecent, lewd, offensive to senses, repulsive, disgusting,
foul, filthy, calculated to corrupt...." BLACK, LAw DICriONARY (4th ed. 1957).
12. Larrabee, The Cultural Context of Sex Censorship, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 672, 674
(1955).
13. Examples are numerous. For a complete discussion of these extralegal forces see: Note,
Extralegal Censorship of Literature, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 989 (1958); Lockhart & McClure,
Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and The Constitution, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 587
(1955); Note, Entertainment: Public Pressures and The Law, 71 HARV. L. REV. 326 (1957).
14. GBLLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 77 (1956).
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same official then added: "Mind you, I don't say it is illegal in fact.
I merely say that in my opinion it would be violative of the law to
distribute it. The distributors usually cooperate by withholding the
book."15
Roth v. United States: 6 The Most Recent Definition by the
Supreme Court
The Roth case seems to make two things clear: first, obscenity is
not within the area of constitutionally protected free speech; and
second, the test for judging obscenity is whether to the average per-
son applying a community standard, the dominant theme of the pub-
lication taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests. However, as
clear as this pronouncement may seem to be, the Court has opened
the door to more problems than it has solved. What is meant by the
use of the words "prurient interest"? Has the Court adopted a test
which intends to protect against sexual thoughts or desires alone,
without any regard to inconsistent conduct? What is the "commu-
nity standard" to be applied? Is it the standard of the community
in which the literature was published, or is it some other community,
and, if so, what is that other community?
It would appear from the test adopted in the Roth case, that the
evil sought to be prevented by the regulation of "obscene" literature
is that of stimulating impure thoughts, without any concern for con-
duct. The judge's charge in the Roth case was: "It must tend to stir
sexual impulses and lead to sexually impure thoughts."' 7 Thus, as
construed by the Court, it would seem that the statute involved in
the Roth case' provided criminal punishment for inducing no more
than thoughts or desires, the ultimate effect of such regulations be-
ing to drastically curtail the protection of the first amendment. The
creation of normal sexual desires is, in itself, neither immoral nor con-
trary to accepted sex standards.
Assuming that the test adopted in the Roth case is to protect the
reader from such lustful thoughts alone, without any regard to the
effect on conduct, is all literature which arouses such thoughts sub-
ject to regulation? In Grove Press, Incorporated v. Chris tenberry,19
decided in 1959, an attempt was made to answer this question. In
holding that D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover was not ob-
scene under the test laid down in the Roth case, the court said:
Even if it be assumed that these passages [describing sexual inter-
course in great detail] and this language [four-letter Anglo-Saxon words
used quite frequently] taken in isolation tend to arouse shameful, morbid
15. ibid.
16. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
17. Record, p. 25, United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958).
19. 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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and lustful sexual desires in the average reader, they are an integral, and
to the author necessary part of the development of theme, plot and
character. The dominant theme, purpose and effect of the book as a
whole is not an appeal to prurience or the prurient minded. The
book is not "dirt for dirts sake." Nor do these passages and this
language subinerge the dominant theme so as to make the book obscene
even if they could be considered and found to be obscene in isolation.20
From this decision it appears that not every work which arouses
lustful thoughts or desires is "obscene," but only those which have
for their dominant purpose the arousing of such thoughts or desires.
Such a test, however, still leaves the ultimate decision up to the courts.
As soon as the appellate level is reached the courts are forced into the
role of censors, determining the dominant purpose of the author.
The advisability of the courts becoming official censors - reading
books and magazines and viewing television and movies to determine
whether the author had for his dominant theme the promotion of
lustful thoughts and desires2 1 - is as doubtful as the test itself. •
The test for judging obscenity adopted in the Roth case presents
a further definitional problem. What is the "community standard"
by which "obscene" literature is to be judged? Is it a nationwide
standard? Is it a statewide standard? Or, is it a local standard?
The mores of the community are inevitably the result of the in-
teraction of many human activities which are the components of the
basic. concepts of morality. These human activities, such as mar-
riage, divorce, non-marital relations, profanity, and many others, not
only vary from state to state, but from local community to local com-
munity. Artistic expression considered shocking in remote rural
areas may be deemed pass6 in large urban centers. On the other
hand, every-day occurrences on the farm may shock those who are not
familiar with the animal world. The diversity of mores and folk-
ways in this country is the food upon which our democratic system
grows.
The simple fact is that, as concerns moral attitudes, there is no
national or state "community." If such be the case, is not the ques-
tion answered, since only the local community remains? In obscenity
regulation, unfortunately, the answer is not that simple. How do we
determine what is the local community? Is it the community in which
the literature is published? Is it the community in which it is read?
Or, is it the community in which the literature is sold? Must a pub-
lisher, who is interested in publishing a particular book or other type
of literature, determine the moral attitude of every community in
which he wishes to sell such literature, before he can safely publish
and sell the work?
These and many other questions present themselves. The only
20. Id. ai 500-01.
21. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 159-60 (1959) (concurring opinion).
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conclusion that can safely be made is that, in the final analysis, the
community standard is that applied by the courts on a case by case
method.
Due Process: The Yoid-for-Jagueness Problem
It is suggested that the uncertainties of the obscenity laws pre-
viously discussed render them unconstitutional under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. The due process clauses of both amend-
ments forbid the imposition of criminal sanctions where punishment
is dependent upon chance, as it is under these laws. When the result
of a proceeding under such regulation depends upon subjective value-
judgments of juries, and upon happenstance of history or geography,
there is no "ascertainable standard of guilt."
In answer to the argument that the statutes involved in the Roth
case did not provide a reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt and,
therefore, violated the constitutional requirement of due process, the
Court stated that "the Constitution does not require impossible stand-
ards; all that is required is that the 'language conveys sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by com-
mon understanding and practices. .. .' "2 Further, the Court said
that the boundaries for judging obscenity give adequate warning of
the conduct proscribed and are sufficiently definite to allow judges
and jurors to administer the law."
However, the Court, when faced with a somewhat different, but
no more precise restraint on freedom of expression than was involved
in the Roth case, said in Winters v. New York:
The standard of certainty in statutes punishing for [criminal] of-
fenses is higher than those depending primarily upon civil sanctions for
enforcement. The crime "must be defined with appropriate definite-
ness" . . . . There must be ascertainable standards of guilt. Men of
common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the
enactment .... 24
The meaning of the legislation involved in obscenity regulation can-
not be ascertained even by men of superior intelligence, for the judges
and juries are left to create their own standard in each case.
The Effect of Thoughts on Conduct
The most obvious omission in all of the decisions in the area of
obscenity is any explanation as to why literature stimulating sexual
thoughts or desires is sufficiently harmful to the public interest to be
called "obscene." Apart from the possibility that sexual thoughts
may stimulate sexual behavior contrary to accepted standards, there
22. Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
23. ibid.
24. 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
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seems to be no reason that justifies regulation of the "obscene." It
is for this reason that most authorities feel that behind all the de-
cisions is the thought of protecting the reader from improper sexual
behavior.2 5 However, in spite of this feeling, the Roth case - the
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the subject - seems
to dispel entirely this idea.
Conceding for the sake of argument that there is the feeling of
protection from improper sexual conduct behind all the decisions in
the area, how real is this threat? Only during the last several years
have the effects of printed matter on readers been studied to any ex-
tent. No study has been made which has shown the causal connec-
tion between reading the "obscene" and improper sexual conduct.
Moreover, "no report can be found of a single effort at genuine re-
search to test this assumption by singling out as a factor for study the
effect of sex literature upon sexual behavior."2
Nor has it been demonstrated that youthful readers, who are sup-
posed to be most susceptible to influence, are affected by such ma-
terial.
Those who would ban books argue that particularly books make forjuvenile delinquency or crime, induce violence and sadism, corrupt taste,
promote sexual perversion, distort human values, subvert political loyal-
ties, provoke disrespect for the law, produce demeaning stereotypes of
groups and, in general, make sin even more attractive than it ordinarily
is. 'When evidence is put forward to support these claims, it is at best
thin and questionable; more characteristically, it is entirely absent37
Where an effect is so out of proportion to its supposed cause, the
conclusion must inevitably follow that other factors are of greater
force.
We start with the proposition that an interest in pornography is
seemingly not the molder of a man's personality but the reflection of it.
Indeed, certain psychological experiments suggest that one who finds
pornographic elements in allegedly obscene books is very likely to dis-
cover them also in apparently innocuous books, through a process of
self-selection and emphasis that the reader himself brings to the words.
The same process of self-selection - this tendency to read and see what
accords with pre-existing interests - probably controls the effects of
reading as well as the determination of what will be read. The fact that
"sex maniacs" may read pornography does not mean that they became
what they are because of their reading, but that their reading became
what it is because of them. Their personality, according to modern
scientific findings that confirm a proposition stated long ago by the
Jesuit fathers, was probably basically formed before they ever learned to
read.28
25. See Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in The Courts, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 587, 592-93
(1955).
26. Id. at 595.
27. MCKEoN, MERTON & GELLuORN, THE FREEDOM TO READ 76 (1956).
28. GELLHORN, INMUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNmNTAL REsTRAn~rs 61-2 (1956).
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Since, at the present time, there exists no positive information on
the relationship between impure thoughts and overt sexual conduct,
it would appear that the courts are not justified in upholding obscen-
ity regulation, unless they are not concerned with the effects of "ob-
scene" literature on conduct. From the decision in the Roth case,
the only reasonable conclusion that can be made is that it is the erotic
stimulation, and not its effect on conduct, which is the basis of ob-
scenity regulation.29
Enforcement
For a long time, much was made of the distinction between a
statute calling for "prior restraint" and one calling for subsequent
criminal punishment.30 The former alone, it was said, raised a ques-
tion of constitutionality under the first amendment. With only a
very few exceptions the strict rule against prior restraint has been ap-
plied by the Supreme Court."' However, in the area of obscenity
regulation the majority of the Court has not reached, in practice, re-
sults consonant with the theory.
Briefly, the doctrine of prior restraint deals with official restric-
tions imposed upon speech or other forms of expression before actual
publication, whereas subsequent punishment is a penalty imposed after
the communication has been made as a sanction for having made it.
Constitutionally, the doctrine holds that the first amendment forbids
the federal government to impose any system of prior restraint, with
certain exceptions,"' in any area of expression that is within the boun-
daries of the amendment. By incorporating the first amendment in-
to the fourteenth amendment, the same limitations are applicable to
the states.
By upholding the validity of obscenity regulation which is not suf-
ficiently definite so as to advise a person of the standard of conduct
required of him, the court has actually furthered the exercise of prior
restraint. "Fear of punishment serves as a powerful restraint on
publication, and fear of punishment often means, fear of prosecu-
tion."'m If the definition of obscenity were sufficiently certain, fear
might deter restricted types of publications. However, obscenity is
incapable of such a definition. Almost any book which deals with
sex in an unconventional manner may very well be subject to prose-
29. For a more thorough examination of this problem, see ELLiS & BRANCALE, Ti PSY-
CHOLOGY OF SEX OFFENDERS (1956); KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND His OF-
FENSES (1954); Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity and The Courts, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
587 (1955).
30. For a good discussion of both terms, see Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20
L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
31. Id. at 660-69.
32. Id. at 648-49.
33. Record, Fol. 69, p. 84, United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 769 (2d Cit. 1956).
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cution and punishment. As a result, the prosecutor wields immense
power which, in fact, results in prior restraint.4
A further problem encountered in the enforcement of obscenity
regulation is that of- scienter - the knowledge required to charge a
man with the consequences, of his act. In Smith v. California," it
was held that possession alone of an "obscene" writing or book was
not sufficient to meet the constitutional requirements of due process
and that some element of scienter was necessary. However, as to
the question of what degree of knowledge is requisite to a constitu-
tionally permissible prosecution for possessing an "obscene" book,
the Court declined to answer, saying that the question was not before
them at this time.36 Interestingly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his
concurring opinion, protested the Court's failure to handle this prob-
lem. He said:
If, as I assume, the requirement of scienter in an obscenity proseca-
tion like the one before us does not mean that the bookseller must have
read the book or substantially know its contents on the one hand, nor on
the other that he can exculpate himself by studious avoidance of knowl-
edge about its contents, then, I submit, invalidating an obscenity statute
because a state dispenses altogether with the requirement of scienter does
require some indication of the scope and quality of scienter that is re-
quired. 87
A problem analogous to that presented in the Smith case recently
confronted the Ohio Supreme Court. In State v. Mapp38 the de-
fendant was convicted under an Ohio statuteP" which prohibits any
person from knowingly having in his possession or under his control
lewd or lascivious books and pictures. Although the court upheld the
conviction of the defendant under this statute, it did so only because
it lacked the necessary majority to hold the statute invalid under the
Ohio Constitution.40 Four of the six judges felt that the statute was
constitutionally invalid.
Under the statute, mere "knowing possession," without the pos-
sessor having for his purpose the sale, lending, giving away, exhibit-
ing or publishing, is prohibited. The majority stated:
If anyone looks at a book and finds it lewd, he is forthwith, ...
guilty of a serious crime .... [A]s a result, some who might otherwise
read books that are not obscene may well be discouraged from doing so
and their free circulation and use will be impeded. 41
34. For instances of such prior restraint see BLANSHARD, TnE RIGHT TO READ 184-86(1955).
35. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
36. Id. at 154.
37. Id. at 162 (concurring opinion).
38. 170 Ohio St. 427 (1960).
39. OHIo REV. CODE § 2905.34 (Supp. 1959).
40. Owo CONST. art. 4, S 2.
41. State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 433 (1960).
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What then, is required in order to have a constitutionally permis-
sible statute? The question has yet to be adequately answered. It
is clear that under the ruling in the Smith case, mere possession alone
is not sufficient; some degree of knowledge is required. Also, it
seems evident that studious inspection is not required. Is mere know-
ing possession enough to have a constitutionally permissible statute?
According to the majority in the Mapp case, it is not. If such legis-
lative prohibition were valid, it might very well discourage people
from even looking at books and pictures, for if they did, and such
books or pictures were determined to be of a lewd or lascivious char-
acter, they would be subject to punishment under such a statute.
THE CULTURAL PROBLEM
To add to the difficulties involved in formulating any law dealing
with obscenity is the problem of the effect of any such law upon the
American culture. In this country, as one notable author so expertly
puts it, ". . . the American popular culture is saturated with sexual
images, references, symbols, and exhortations .... 42
Expecting much of sex, but feeling as individals that much is denied
them, Americans, as a mass, create in the substance of suppressed desire
the remarkable symbolic figures that are found here as in no other
culture. The existence of "the great American love goddess" is more
often noted than explained .... She is most often a movie star though
her talents as an actress and the merits of the films in which she
appears are plainly immaterial Her primary function is widely under-
stood but rarely mentioned - that is, to serve as the object of autoerotic
reverie. She represents, in brief, the commercial exploitation of the
assumption that the American public is composed largely of Peeping
Toms. 43
Thus, it seems that what is today readily acceptable in fact be-
comes unacceptable when put on paper. Blood and guts are tolerated
by society, except when combined with sexual love; great profit is
made from sex through advertising, e.g., the women's underwear that
is advertised so far beyond its market that we are daily surrounded
by the feminine figure tightly constrained in a bra and panties; homo-
sexuality is the favorite subject of many a "clean" joke; and, general-
ly, our society produces a great deal that, if properly identified,
would be called more perverse than it cares to think about. All of
these are permitted, and yet society seeks to remove the normal
thoughts and desires of one sex for the other. The problem is being
further distorted by the enactment of laws calculated to suppress
sexual thoughts, for in effect, by so doing, our society is diminishing
the healthy and accentuating the sick.
42. Larrabee, The Cultural Context of Sex Censorship, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 672, 683
(1955).




If society continues to suppress that which is calculated to arouse
sexual feelings and desires to all but those who are willing to break
the law, then it can have no complaint if the result is the cessation of
artistic quality in this country.
If, as many believe, something must be done to suppress this in-
tangible thing called "obscenity," it is believed that such suppression
can not be adequately achieved through the legislature or the courts,
but must be achieved through self-censorship. It is firmly believed
that the American people have the ability to recognize "smut" and to
reject it without the help of the public censor.
As the majority in the Smith case admitted, "any form of crimi-
nal obscenity statute applicable to a bookseller will induce some ten-
dency to self-censorship and have some inhibitory effect on the dis-
semination of material not obscene. .. "" Since this is true, is it not
a very good reason for leaving dosed, as to the "obscene," the doors
barring federal and state intrusion into the area of constitutionally
protected free speech and press. '
BRUCE L. NEWMAN
44. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1959).
45. The statement to which this refers was first made by the Court in Rot v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957). The Court said:
"The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contributed greatly to the
development and well-being of our free society and are indispensable to its continued
growth. Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent their erosion by Congress
or by the States. The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot
be left ajar, it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack neces-
sary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests." (Emphasis added.)
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